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Recent Case
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SIXTH AMENDMENT-
ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO DEFEND PRO SE-RIGHTS
NECESSARY FOR FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
I. INTRODUCrION
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court, in Faretta v.
California,' held that a criminal defendant has a qualified constitu-
tional right to self-representation, derived from the sixth amend-
ment.2 The state cannot force counsel upon a defendant in a
criminal prosecution who voluntarily and intelligently elects to
represent himself.
Faretta is the most recent in a series of cases which have
expanded the meaning of the sixth amendment right to counsel.
The development began primarily with the recognition by the
Court in Powell v. Alabama,3 that the right to counsel in capital
cases is a fundamental right, and therefore protected by the
fourteenth amendment from state infringement. In successive
cases, the Court announced additional situations in which counsel
must be present to ensure the protection of the defendant's rights
under the fourteenth amendment due process clause. In Gideon
v. Wainwright,4 it was held that in all felony cases there is a right
to counsel, and the further right to have counsel appointed if the
defendant is indigent. In addition, the Court has held that there
is a right to counsel in misdemeanor cases where there is the possi-
bility of detention, 5 in certain "critical" pretrial stages,6 and in
certain post-conviction proceedings. 7
1. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ...
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
6. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 339 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hear-
ing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (line-ups); Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (pretrial insanity hearings).
7. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (sentencing). Cf. Cagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (under certain circumstances, due process
requires the assistance of counsel at parole or probation revocation hearings).
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Underlying these decisions are two interdependent premises:
"[N]otice and hearing... constitute basic elements of the constitu-
tional requirement of due process of law," 8 and "the right to be
heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not compre-
hend the right to be heard by counsel."9 The Court, explaining
the need for professional legal representation, stated:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged
with crimes, he is incapable, generally, of determining
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He
is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence ...
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he has a perfect one.
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceeding against him. Without it, though he
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because
he does not know how to establish his innocence.10
Due process is not satisfied merely by the appointment of
counsel. The appointment must occur at a stage in the proceed-
ings which will result in "effective aid in the preparation and trial
of the case.f 1 Despite recognition of the importance of represen-
tation by counsel and the pitfalls facing the pro se defendant, the
Court in Faretta held that the sixth amendment does not preclude
a pro se defense. Self-representation is an independent, funda-
mental right protected by the fourteenth a.nendment.
This Note will first examine the Court's analysis in Faretta. It
will then consider the implications of Faretta in a society which
tends to overlook the need for independent, autonomous decision-
making.
II. THE FACrS
The circumstances of Faretta's conviction comported with the
established standards for a fair trial.12 He had been charged with
8. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
9. Id. at 68-69.
10. Id. at 69.
11. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
12. The Court deliberately ... declines to characterize this case as one
in which the defendant was denied a fair trial." 422 U.S. 806, 837 n.2 (1975).
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grand theft on an information filed in Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, California. 8 At his arraignment, the judge ap-
pointed counsel. However, prior to trial, Faretta requested that
he be allowed to represent himself, stating as one of his reasons
that the public defender's office was overloaded. 14 The trial
judge questioned Faretta and discovered that he had a high
school education, and that he had represented himself unsuc-
cessfully in a previous criminal prosecution. The judge, reserving
the right to reverse his decision if warranted by future develop-
ments, then made a preliminary ruling that Faretta could represent
himself. Weeks later, the judge held a hearing, questioning
Faretta on different points of the law.15 The judge concluded that
13. Id. at 807.
14. Id.
15. The judge's questioning of Faretta is reproduced here from the opinion
to indicate that Faretta did seem strikingly capable. It further suggests that
the Supreme Court was eager to face the issue of a constitutional right to
self-representation, but had delayed until it was presented with a case wherein
the defendant was clearly capable of learning the law to defend himself. The
excerpt demonstrates that Faretta was the ideal test case for a difficult issue.
The colloquy was as follows:
THE COURT: In the Faretta matter, I brought you back down
here to do some reconsideration as to whether or not you should
continue to represent yourself.
How have you been getting along on your research?
THE DEFENDANT: Not bad, your H6nor.
Last night I put in the mail a 995 motion [for setting aside the
indictment or information] and it should be with the Clerk within
the next day or two.
THE COURT: Have you been preparing yourself for the intricacies
of the trial of the matter?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, your Honor, I was hoping that the
case could possibly be disposed of on the 995.
Mrs. Ayers informed me yesterday that it was the Court's policy
to hear the pretrial motions at the time of trial. If possible, your
Honor, I would like a date set as soon as the Court deems adequate
after they receive the motion, sometime before trial.
THE COURT: Let's see how you have been doing on your re-
search.
How many exceptions are there to the hearsay rule?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, the hearsay rule would, I guess, be
called the best evidence rule, your Honor. And there are several
exceptions in case law, but in actual'statutory law, I-don't feel there
is none [sic].
THE COURT: What are the challenges to the jury for cause?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, there is twelve peremptory challenges.
THE COURT: And how many for cause?
TIe DEFENDANT: 'Well, as many as the Court deems valid.
[Vol. 27:412
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both Faretta's demeanor and his responses to the questions indi-
cated that he could not have made an intelligent and knowing
waiver of his right to counsel. He ruled that Faretta must have
counsel, there being no constitutional right in California to defend
pro se.16 Faretta's requests to act as co-counsel and to make various
motions on his own behalf were also rejected. The court ruled
that for the duration of the proceeding Faretta's defense must be
conducted only through the lawyer appointed from the public de-
fender's office.
THE COURT: And what are they? What are the grounds for
challenging a juror for cause?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, numerous grounds to challenge a wit-
ness-I mean, a juror, your Honor, one being the juror is perhaps
suffered, was a victim of the same type of offense, might be prejudiced
toward the defendant. Any substantial ground that might make the
juror prejudice[d] toward the defendant.
THE COURT: Anything else?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, a relative perhaps of the victim.
* 0 *
THE COURT: Have you looked in any of the California Codes
with reference to trial procedure?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: What codes?
THE DEFENDANT: I have done extensive research in the Penal
Code, your Honor, and the Civil Code.
THE COURT: If you have done extensive research into it, then
tell me about it.
THE DEFENDANT: On empaneling a jury, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
THE DEFENDANT: Well, the District Attorney and the defend-
ant, defense counsel, has both the right to 12 peremptory challenges
of a jury. These 12 challenges are undisputable. Any reason tat
the defense or prosecution should feel that a juror would be inade-
quate to try the case or to rule on a case, they may then discharge
thatjuror.
But if there is a valid challenge due to grounds of prejudice or
some other grounds, that these aren't considered in the 12 per-
emptory challenges. There are numerous and the defendant, the
defense and the prosecution both have the right to make any inquiry
to the jury as to their feelings toward the case.
422 U.S. 806, 808-10 n.3 (1975). It should be noted that Faretta's lack of
success in his first pro se effort should not be read as an indication of incom-
petence. If one's reputation for skill depended solely upon not-guilty verdicts,
there would be few practicing attorneys with presentable reputations.
16. Id. at 811 n.6. Shortly before the California Supreme Court decided in
People v. Sharp, 7 Cal.3d 448, 233, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. that there
was no state constitutional right to a pro se defense, the California Constitution
had been amended to require counsel in felony cases. See CAL. PEN. CODE
§§ 686(2), 686.1, 859, 987 (West 1972).
19761
416 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Faretta was convicted and appealed unsuccessfully on the
grounds that he had been denied due process. He asserted that the
trial court's rejection of his attempted waiver and the imposition
of counsel were unconstitutional. A petition for rehearing and a
further appeal to the California Supreme Court were both denied.
The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari, address-
ing the question "whether a defendant in a state criminal trial has
the constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he volun-
tarily and intelligently elects to do so."'17
IM. THE MAJO~rrY OPIIoN
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority of the Court, concluded
that a state cannot force counsel upon an accused. The decision
was premised upon three main arguments. First, the right of self-
representation was found to be implicit in the sixth amendment.,,
Second, support for such a reading of the sixth amendment seemed
clear from an analysis of seventeenth and eighteenth century
colonial practice and contemporaneous developments in British
law. 9 Finally, a survey of contemporary federal and state decisions
led to the conclusion that the Court was confronted with a "nearly
universal conviction, on the part of our people as well as our courts,
that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to
his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so." 20
A. The Implicit Right to Self-Representation
Justice Stewart's interpretation of the sixth amendment com-
prises the primary argument. He asserts that both the structure
and the logic of the sixth amendment would be violated if the
accused were not granted the constitutional right to self-represen-
tation. Justice Stewart relies upon the directive language of the
sixth amendment granting in sum the "right... to make a defense
as we know it."21 He states that the right to a defense is not
merely provided for the accused; it is given to him personally. The
most personal defense, the right to self-representation is "neces-
sarily implied by the structure of the sixth amendment." 2 2 Further-
17. 422 U.S. at 807.
18. Id. at 818.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 817.
21. Id. at 818.
22. Id. at 819.
[Vol. 27:412
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more, the logic of the sixth amendment is contravened when counsel
is forced upon the accused.23
To reach his conclusion, Justice Stewart views the assistance of
counsel as a supplement to the bundle of other rights guaranteed
by the sixth amendment Assistance means an aid, not a master.
If the accused is forced to accept the representation of counsel
against his will, he enjoys not a personal defense, but a defense
imposed by the will of the state. The power of counsel to make
decisions binding on the defendant is justified only by the initial
consent of the defendant. Absent that consent, the theory that
counsel "represents" the defendant is an "unacceptable legal fic-
tion."24  In short, "[u]nless the accused has acquiesced in such
representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed
him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it not his de-
fense." 2
The dissenters did not make a serious effort to refute Justice
Stewart's reasoning concerning the sixth amendment. They saw
the majority's conclusion as stating only the "trivial proposition"
that it is the accused who is on trial and in need of a defense.26
The thought that counsel is a mere tool was an untenable proposi-
tion in light of the Court's determination in a number of previous
decisions that assistance of counsel is an integral, rather than sup-
plemental, part of the sixth amendment 27
Justice Stewart's construction of the sixth amendment is not
unreasonable despite the dissents objections. Indeed, he recog-
nizes that self-representation is not to be found in the Constitution
"in so many words." 28 However, Justice Stewart believes that the
intent of -the Framers of the Constitution was to protect the right
to a personal defense. If the defendant could not choose to repre-
sent himself, this right would be a nullity. Moreover, the absolute
denial of a constitutional right to self-representation is inconsistent
with that purpose of due process which concerns itself with "insur-
23. Id. at 820.
24. Id. at 821.
25. Id. (emphasis original).
26. Id. at 837-38 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 838-39. Justice Burger argues that the "right to a defense as
we know it" cannot be had without counsel. Id. See Argensinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 27-33 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963);
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
28. 422 U.S. at 819.
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ing respect for the dignity of the individual." 2 The policies which
find expression in a prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures,30 and the inadmissibility of tainted evidence31 indicate
that due process contemplates more than procedural accuracy of
guilt determination.3 2 Forcing the defendant to stand dumb against
his will while another argues his case reflects a low regard for the
individual.
B. Historical Basis
The second basis for the majority decision was drawn from a
survey of seventeenth and eighteenth century practice.33 Lawyers
were distrusted by the colonists, and the Constitution was written
at a time when anti-lawyer sentiment ran particularly high.3 4 Nearly
all the early colonial charters and bills of rights provided a defend-
ant with the choice of the right to counsel or the right of self-
representation. 35 State constitutions passed after the Declaration
of Independence contained provisions allowing for self-representa-
tion. If assistance of counsel were granted, it was only in the alter-
native, and was not meant to disparage the essential right to defend
pro se.s6
Justice Stewart found additional historical evidence to support
his finding that self-representation was well recognized. Congress
passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 making the-right to self-represen-
tation statutory in federal cases.37 That act was signed into law one
day before the sixth amendment was proposed by Madison. How-
ever, the virtual absence of any debate on the assistance of counsel
clause of the sixth amendment indicated to Justice Stewart that it
29. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A
Survey and Criticksm, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 347 (1957). Kadish argues that the
aims of due process are to achieve accuracy in the guilt determination process
while maintaining the dignity of the individual.
30. "The right of the people to be secure .. . against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated .. " U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
31. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
32. Kadish, supra note 28, at 347.
33. 422 U.S. 806, 826-32.
34. Id. at 827.
35. See generally I.B. ScuwAnz, TE Bmt. OF RIGHTS, A Docu .ENARY
HISTORY (1971).
36. 422 U.S. at 828.
37. "[1In all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage
their own causes personally or by the assistance of such counsel ...... Judi-
ciary Act of 1789 § 35, 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970).
[Vol. 27:412
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was meant only to supplement rights already existing. He reasoned:
Had the Congress anticipated that Madison's proposal would work
to the exclusion of self-representation, surely there would have
been argument. Self-representation played too great a role in the
seventeenth century for the Founding Fathers to allow it to be
discontinued without remark. Wary colonists were reluctant to
trust most lawyers. Justice Stewart concluded that silence must
be construed as an expectation that pro se rights were protected
or "undoubtedly [there would] have been some debate or comment
on the issue." 38 In short, the majority read the sixth amendment
as granting certain rights in federal cases which many of the states
had already provided. It was not meant to preclude or diminish
rights already recognized on the state level.
The dissenters rejected this second argument. Chief Justice
Burger interpreted the historical setting of the sixth amendment
as suggesting the opposite conclusion. He argued that if the sixth
amendment were meant to provide for self-representation, then
Congress would have had no need to enact section 35 of the Judi-
ciary Act. The contemporaneous action of Congress in granting a
statutory status to self-representation and a constitutional one to
counsel clearly indicated the appropriate protection for each.39
Justice Stewart's historical interpretation presumes considera-
tion of the overriding purpose of the Framers in enacting the Bill
of Rights; he does not focus upon the specific words which they
used. Commentators note that debate centered upon the need for
amendments, not on their substance.40 The Constitution described
a limited government No prior existing rights had been nullified
so as to require specific protection. The accepted belief seems to
have been that criminal procedure would continue much as before.41
Protection of the defendant's rights to be informed of the charges
against him and to confront witnesses reflects the expectation that
the accused would be in court presenting his defense. A trial in
the defendant's absence was inconceivable. Trial without the
assistance of counsel was more easily anticipated.
Because assistance of counsel was granted only in capital cases,
it was a right requiring the more certain protection of a constitu-
38. 422 U.S. at 832.
39. Id. at 844.
40. U.S. Gov'T PRnTrmc OFFICE, THE CoNSTrruTioN OF THE UNrrED
STATEs or AmERucA, ANALYSIS Ai INTERPRErATioN 897-98 (1973).
41. W. BE&NEY, TiE RIGHT TO COUNSEL iN AMEmucAN CoURTs 23 (1955).
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tional amendment. The difference in treatment accorded self-
representation and assistance of counsel suggests that the right
to counsel was indeed only supplemental to a basic expectation
that the accused would present his own case. Perhaps it is pre-
cisely because the use of counsel was not commonplace that it
needed the more expanded and certain protection given by the
sixth amendment.
It was not crucial, however, that Justice Stewart reconcile the
Judiciary Act and the sixth amendment in order to reach his con-
clusion. A determination of the Framers' actual intent is certainly
not dispositive in the determination of what rights exist under a
modem reading of the Constitution. The tendency of recent courts
to expand the scope of individual liberties granted by the Bill of
Rights demonstrates that the original intention underlying consti-
tutional provisions is seldom an appropriate gauge for modem
constitutional interpretation.42  Therefore, whether a personal de-
fense as understood in the twentieth century requires a constitu-
tional right to self-representation remains unanswerable from a
purely historical perspective.
C. Modern Decisions
The third argument Justice Stewart presented was that of con-
sistency with modem federal and state opinions. He felt his read-
ing of the sixth amendment was compatible with the prevailing
modem practice.43 Justice Stewart asserted that the case of Adams
v. United States ex rel. McCann4 lends clear support to the prop-
osition that there exists a constitutional right to self-representation.
There, the "right to dispense with a lawyer's help"45 was described
as correlative to the right to assistance of counsel. In Adams, the
Court also recognized that "[tlo deny an accused a choice of pro-
42. Indeed, it is seldom that the intent of the Framers, as it might be
gleaned from contemporary writing, can be dispositive of what the Consti-
tution might require in the twentieth century. The debate regarding the
original understanding of the first amendment protection of speech is a clear
example. Compare L. Lv, LuEAcY OF SuPPREssImO: FREEnOm oF SPEzcH
AND PEss xN EALY AmEcAN w HSTORY (1960) with Z. CirFEx, FsE
SPEECH iN Tm UN=n STATEs (1948).
43. 422 U.S. at 816-17.
44. 317 U.S. 269 (1942). The Court held that in a criminal prosecution
in a federal court, an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice
and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury, and
also the assistance of counsel.
45. Id. at 279.
[Vol. 2.7:412
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cedure in circumstances in which he, though a layman, is as capable
as any lawyer of making an intelligent choice, is to impair the worth
of great Constitutional safeguards by treating them as empty
verbalisms." 46 The Adams dicta was unequivocally reaffirmed in
Carter v. Illinois.47 The Court there stated:
Neither the historic conception of Due Process nor the
vitality it derives from progressive standards of justice
denies a person the right to defend himself or to confess
guilt. Under appropriate circumstances the Constitu-
tion requires that counsel be tendered; it does not re-
quire that under all circumstances counsel could be
forced upon a defendant.48
However, the language upon which Justice Stewart relied is
somewhat misleading. The Court in Adams and Carter was speak-
ing of the right to waive counsel. The issue was not whether a
constitutional right to waive existed, but merely whether waiver
was constitutionally permissible within the facts of each case. The
dissent in Faretta properly noted that one cannot rely wholly upon
the dicta of a court in determining an issue as important as a con-
stitutional right when the court from which support is derived was
not itself faced with constitutional issues. Indeed, the Supreme,
Court in Singer v. United States,49 specifically indicated that "[t]he
ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with
it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right." 8 0 However,
Justice Stewart stated that Singer was not controlling. The right
of self-representation is a separate, indepepident, constitutionally
compelled right-not just a corollary to the right to counsel.51
The precise language and context of the Supreme Court waiver
cases is not conclusive. The chief significance of the Adams and
Carter dicta is the Court's demonstrated concern that the defendant
not be fettered by constitutional safeguards. The cases do not
explicitly support a finding that self-representation is a constitu-
tional right. However, their language and reasoning do indicate
that Justice Stewart was justified in finding that a state may not
impose counsel against the wishes of the accused.
46. Id. at 280.
47. 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
48. Id. at 174-75.
49. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
50. Id. at 34-35.
51. 422 U.S. at 819-20 n.15.
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The quoted language from the Adams and Carter decisions had
been cited by those state and lower federal courts which held self-
representation to be a constitutionally protected right. In Faretta,
Justice Stewart noted especially United States v. Plattner52 in
which the Second Circuit reversed a conviction for which the
defendant had not been allowed to defend pro se. The Plattner
decision can be distinguished from Faretta. The Court there de-
termined that the defendant had been prejudiced by counsel who
failed to present as effective a defense as Plattner himself might
have. However, the Second Circuit reatirmed its holding in sub-
sequent cases.53 In addition, many state courts have expressly
recognized the constitutional nature of the right to self-representa-
tion.54
Although he searched carefully among the available precedent
for evidence that self-representation was "fundamental," Justice
Stewart was not successful in creating a persuasive argument to that
effect. Not one of the three main arguments Justice Stewart pre-
sents is conclusive that self-representation is so fundamental it must
be given absolute constitutional status. Instead, after reading the
alternative arguments of the dissenting Justices, one is left with
the impression that the majority cut some very sharp comers. How-
ever, even though the majority is unable to precisely and unequiv-
ocally support its decision, the result is compelled by a longer
look at a prevailing undercurrent in constitutional theory. The
sharp division on the Court indicates that it was a most unusual
matter that was facing the Court in Faretta. Indeed, the Court
was asked to hold that to interpret one of the seminal rights of
due process adjudication as being absolutely mandatory was in
itself a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
IV. Tim ImPLcATioNs FOR AUToNoMY
The Court in Faretta held that due process demands that a
crimnal defendant be given the right to make an independent
decision to represent himself. This may present an inherent in-
52. 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
53. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d
Cir. 1965).
54. See, e.g., Lockard v. State, 92 Idaho 813, 451 P.2d 1014 (1969);
People v. Nelson, 47 IM. 2d 570, 268 N.E.2d 2 (1971); State v. Mems, 281
N.C. 658, 190 S.E.2d 164 (1972); People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 53
N.E.2d 356 (1944); State v. Verna, 9 Ore. App. 620, 498 P.2d 793 (1972).
[Vol. 27:412
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consistency with other due process requirements. Because self-
representation was extended through the fourteenth amendment,
one must conclude that freedom of choice, from which the ac-
cused's pro se right is derived, is an element of liberty protected
by the fourteenth amendment from state infringement. However,
the choice to defend pro se may, in effect, deny the defendant the
effective assistance of counsel also required by the siith and four-
teenth amendments. Forcing one essential element of due process
-effective counsel-upon the defendant, is to deprive him of an-
other. The cost to the defendant which Justice Sutherland de-
scribed 55 suggests the importance which the Court ascribes to
individual choice.
The decision in Faretta is essentially a statement on autonomy.
The Constitution grants the accused the right to decide whether
counsel is beneficial to his trial. It is an area of decisionmaking
in which the state has limited power to interfere. The concept of
autonomy has been asserted throughout the development of con-
stitutional law. Although the Court's opinion in Faretta appears
to be at variance with "right to counsel" cases, the right of the ac-
cused to decide follows logically from recent cases in areas other
than criminal justice.
Modem recognition of individual autonomy is a resurgence
of older theory. It can be traced to the eighteenth century vested
or natural rights concept underlying the whole constitutional
structure.5 6 The combination of those rights comprises the liberty
of the individual. 57 A government cannot create those rights, for
they inhere in the individual by merit of his very existence.58 The
Constitution, therefore, does no more than define the degree to
which their free exercise may be restricted 59 A constitutional gov-
ernment is by definition a government whose power is limited by
55. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
56. Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUm. L. REv. 1410, 1412 (1974).
See generally, E. CoRwIN, LIBmTY AGAINST COEy mx (1948). Consider
also the language of the Declaration of Independence "[t]hat all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable
rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness."
Briefly, natural rights are "those which grow out of the nature of man and
depend upon personality, as distinguished from such as are created by law
and depend upon civilized society." B.ACks LAw DICTIONARY 1487 (reV.
4th ed. 1968).
57. Henkin, supra note 56, at 1412.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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the consent of the people governed. Natural rights can be circum-
scribed by government regulation only to the extent necessary for
the people to exist peaceably in a community.60 The regulation
must be directed towards achieving a legitimate state purpose; the
means chosen to effectuate that purpose may not cause a greater
infringement upon individual rights than is necessary.6'
The term "natural" or "vested" rights was also popular in early
state court decisions.0 2 The common belief was that the states
could not impair the exercise of individual freedom. To be sure,
there has been fluctuation in the Court's readiness to read unwrit-
ten rights into the Constitution.6 ' However, with the advent of the
60. Consider, for example, a statement by the early Court: "[A]n Act of
the Legislature.... contrary to the great first principles of the social compact
cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority .. " Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis original).
61. "[T]he nature and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of
it. .. . There are acts which the Federal or State legislatures cannot do
without exceeding their authority." Id. (emphasis original); see Corwin, supra
note 56, at 58-116.
62. See, e.g., Proprietors v. Laboree, 2 Greed. 275, 294 (Me. 1823);
Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416 (Pa. 1808); Jackson v. Catlin, 2 Johns. 247
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807).
63. For example, Justice Iredell, concurring in the result reached in Calder,
stated:
It is true that some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative
act against natmral justice must, in itself, be void; but I cannot think
that, under such a government, any Court of Justice would possess a
power to declare it so....
[T]he ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard;
the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and
all that the court could properly say, in such an event, would be,
that the legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion), had
passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent
with the abstract principles of natural justice.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398-99. Compare this statement with Justice Black's
dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965):
I discuss the due process and the Ninth Amendment arguments to-
gether because on analysis they turn out to be the same thing-merely
using different words to claim for this Court and the federal judiciar
power to invalidate any legislative act which the judges find irrationa,
unreasonable or offensive.
Id. at 511. See also Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), wherein he decries the tendency of the majority to interpret
the fourteenth amendment in terms of prevailing economic theory. "The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."
Id. at 75. As indicated by the recurrent arguments noted above, it is dubious
whether the "proper method" of constitutional interpretation will ever be
found. Natural rights language seldom actually disappears; when it reappears
it is often in label only-for example, the concept of reserved ninth amendment
rights put forth by Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479,486 (1965).
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fourteenth amendment the prominence of vested rights language
in court decisions was reestablished.
The interpretation given the fourteenth amendment reflected a
different approach to the vested rights theory.64 The individual
was no longer perceived as a priori immune from government regu-
lation (save of course for the reasonable exercise of power). In-
stead, the liberty of the individual was the sum of the rights left
to him after the state had imposed legitimate restrictions for the
public welfare.e5 Gradually, the Court developed the concept of
substantive due process. Liberty and property were defined as
the composite of the individual's natural rights.6  The initial em-
phasis was upon the protection of property,67 but this term was
given an increasingly broad interpretation. 8 It came to embrace
the right of the individual to contract freely without interference
by the government. The right to contract was also an important
element of liberty. 9 The concepts of liberty and property were
overlapping and that complementary interpretation served to pre-
serve the individual's autonomy, leaving him still essentially free
in his pursuits.70 Eventually,. generous interpretation, joined with a
pervasive espousal of laissez-faire economic attitudes and uncertain
notions of the permissible scope of police power, propelled the
64. Henkin, supra note 56, at 1114.
65. Henkin notes that those justices who developed substantive due process
spoke in language tending to suggest not a priori autonomy of the individual,
as implied in pure natural rights theory, but liberty described by the rights left
to him after others had been granted to the government. Id. at 1414 n.8.
66. Consider the following language by the "father of substantive due
process":
[In my view, a law which prohibits a large class of citizens from
adopting a lawful employment... does deprive them of liberty as
well as property, without due process of law. Their right of choice
is a. portion of their -liberty; their occupation is their property.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 122 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). One notes that Mr. Justice Bradley, was, to
the irony of constitutional history, on the "losing" side, before the Court
espoused his theories without reservation.
67. See B. McCLosaY, THE AmmEcAN SUPREME CouRT 121-35 (1960).
68. Henkin, supra note 56, at 1415.
69. "Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private
property ... is the right to make contracts." Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S.
1, 14 (1915). See also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
70. Consider the Court's language in Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 655 (1875). "There are ... rights in every free government be-
yond the control of the State .... There are limitations on [governmental
power] which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments. Im-
plied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could
not exist. . . " Id. at 662-63.
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Court into full-blown judicial indiscretion.71 Substantive due proc-
ess became an epithet for what many considered inappropriate
judicial activism in the protection of economic rights.72
However, that same exegesis which led the Court to invalidate
economic legislation also produced important restatements of the
freedom of individuals. The curbs imposed on government's power
to regulate the economy similarly protected the individual from
government regulation of his daily affairs. For example, in All-
geyer v. Illinois,73 an early economic due process case, the Court
stated: "Liberty ... means not only the right of the citizen to be
free from the mere physical restraint of [one's] person, as by in-
carceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the
citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties .... ., 74 Eco-
nomic regulation has long since been considered a proper matter
for state control.7" However, certain noneconomic definitions of
liberty promoted in the era of substantive due process have
remained the basis for modem cases on autonomy.
In Meyer v. Nebraska,76 Justice McReynolds stated: "[w]ithout
doubt, [liberty] denotes . . . also the right of the individual to
71. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization of a "third
generation imbecil"); Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of
speech subordinated to the public good of furthering the war effort without
interference); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (police
power does not extend to regulation of wages and prices because it interferes
with rights of offer and acceptance); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)
(police power does not extend to protecting the individual laborer against
"yellow-dog" contracts); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (police power
does extend to protect women from having to work too long hours); Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (no protection for the number of hours a
male may work in a bakery); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
(police power extends to compulsory vaccination); Holden v. Hardy, 169
U.S. 366 (1898) (police power may limit working hours in the mines to eight
hours); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (prohibiting the sale of
liquor); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (the state may regulate the
rates charged for grain elevators).
72. See, e.g., Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 39 HARv. L. REV. 431 (1926), for an argument that liberty means no
more than freedom from restraint in the common law sense of the term.
73. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
74. Id. at 589.
75. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri,
342 U.S. 421 (1952); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish. 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v.
N.Y., 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See also R. G. MCGLOSKEY, supra note 67,
at 161-64.
76. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men." 77 Accordingly, a German teacher could not be restricted
from seeking employment, and the state could not control the
parents' right to choose the education of their children. This
theory was applied two years later to strike down an Oregon stat-
ute which required public education for children.78 It was for the
parents to exercise their own choice in deciding between private
and parochial schools.
With the rejection by the Court of the discredited substantive
due process approach went the sweeping articulation of individual
liberty and autonomy.79 Protection of the individual proceeded
instead through the gradual recognition of certain fundamental
rightsO Those rights were "incorporated" into the fourteenth
amendment, further qualifying the permissible range of state in-
fringement.8' There developed "a congeries of particular discrete
rights enjoying some protection against infringement even for pub-
lic good."82 Presumptively immune in varying degrees to state
regulation, those rights define "special zones of autonomy." 8 3 In
sum, they represent the liberty which an individual retains. In the
last decade, the Court has continued to refer to and build upon
those rights recognized by earlier decisions. They are the basic
underpinnings of the Court's clearest modem pronouncements on
autonomy.
In 1965 the Court announced a new fundamental right-the
right of privacy. The Court held in Griswold v. Connecticut 4 that
77. Id. at 399.
78. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Disgruntled parents
sought a parochial education for their children.
79. Henkin, supra note 56, at 1417.
80. Id. at 1418.
81. See generally Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth
Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963) for an excellent analysis of the Court's
struggle to develop an acceptable interpretation of the fourteenth amendment
due process requirement. Clearly, as the Court applied an increasing number
of the original rights in the first eight amendments to the states, the states
were more severely restricted in their power to control the individual.
82. Henkin, supra note 56, at 1418-19.
83. Id.
84. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the state legislature had infringed upon the plaintiffs right of pri-
vacy by banning the use of contraceptives without showing that
there was a compelling state interest to do so. The restrictions
imposed upon their use produced an unwarranted interference with
the marital relationship. Drawing upon the rights guaranteed by
five different amendments,8 5 Justice Douglas announced that "vari-
ous [constitutional] guarantees create zones of privacy." 86 Mar-
riage was a "relationship lying within the zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." 7  Although
Justice Douglas disclaimed any suggestion that the Court was
returning to substantive due process in its interpretive methodol-
ogy, he was unsuccessful in dispelling that appearance. 8
However, the necessity of recognizing the demand for indi-
vidual choice, which produced a renewed contemplation of vested
rights, indicates the concern of the Court with increased protec-
tion for individual autonomy. The element of individual choice
subsumed within the right of privacy was made more certain in
subsequent language of the Court. 9 The right of the individual
to make important personal decisions, without interference by the
state, was reasserted.
Finally, the Court in Roe v. Wade9" held that the right of pri-
vacy encompassed the decision of a woman to terminate a preg-
nancy. It established (with certain limits) the right of the woman
to make an independent decision regarding abortion free from the
strictures of prohibitory state regulation. Justice Stewart, concur-
85. The amendments upon which Justice Douglas relied were the first,
with the "freedom to associate and the privacy in one's association"; the third,
in its prohibition against quartering soldiers "in any house" without consent
of the owner; the fourth and fifth, for their "protection against all governmental
invasions of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life"; and the
ninth, which provides for the retention by the people of rights not otherwise
enumerated.
86. Id. at 484.
87. Id. at 485.
88. See, e.g., Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Funda-
mental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 235
(1965). Again, expansive definitions of liberty and the Court's inability to
find an explicit grant of the right to privacy generated the basic question of
the appropriate function of the Court. See note 63 supra.
89. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individ-
ual, . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
fundamentally affecting-a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." (emphasis original). Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
90. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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ring, noted explicitly that the liberty protected by the fourteenth
amendment was a "freedom of personal choice" 91 in certain matters.
The Griswold and Wade decisions are important theoretical
precursors to Faretta. For, there are two distinct elements to the
right of privacy.92 One contemplates freedom from government
intrusion; the other relates to government regulation of certain
types of choices.93 It is the latter which concerns us here. While
the ostensible purpose of permitting the use of contraceptives is to
remove state restrictions upon certain activity within the marital
relationship, the relief from regulation works primarily to preserve
the right to independent decisionmaking. Indeed, the Court cited
Meyer v. Nebraska9 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters5 as indication
that certain decisions belong peculiarly to the individual and not
to the state. This freedom from government regulation has also
been described as "a prima facie zone of autonomy." 96 The right of
privacy guarantees immunity to regulation in certain areas funda-
mentally affecting the individual.
The relationship between the right of self-representation and
the right of privacy may not be immediately apparent. However,
the same concern with autonomy which led the Court in Gris-
wold to establish the right of privacy was implicit in Faretta.
The concept of autonomy is basic to the Court's affirmation of
privacy. It is clear that one element of privacy is private, inde-
pendent decisionmaking. As Justice Stewart maintained in Faretta,
"[w]hatever else may be said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights,
surely there can be no doubt that they understood the inestimable
worth of free choice." 97 The distinction between Faretta and the
privacy cases lies primarily in their factual bontext. But both rest
on common ground, for surely there can be no decision more funda-
mental to the individual than that which concerns his very
freedom.
In short, the Court in Faretta has come full circle. The indi-
vidual of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was endowed
91. Id. at 169.
92. See generally Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in PmvAcY 169 (J. Pen-
nock & J. Chapman eds. 1971); Note, Roe and Paris; Does Privacy Have a
Principle, 26 STAN. L. BEv. 1161 (1974).
93. Henkin, supra note 56, at 1424.
94. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
95. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
96. Henkin, supra note 56, at 1425.
97. 422 U.S. at 833-34.
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with vested natural rights. He was regarded as presumptively free
from regulation to which he did not consent. As the Court moved
through successive phases of constitutional interpretation, the
autonomy of the individual was promoted through different judi-
cial constructions. Within the last decades, the concept of natural
rights has made a tentative reappearance. More importantly, how-
ever, the Court has chosen to refer explicitly to freedom in decision-
making-a mark of individual autonomy.
V. THE IMPLICATiONS oF Faretta
Notwithstanding the theoretical justifications for the Court's
decision to grant the right of self-representation, there are diffi-
culties with its acceptance which fall into three broad categories.
The first objection and one put forth by the dissenters is that in
looking primarily to the interests of the defendant, the majority
seems to have ignored legitimate state concerns. It devotes only
minimal attention to the conflicting demands of the state and the
individual. A second weakness of the Court's opinion lies in
Justice Stewart's inability to rest his holding directly upon textual
language. Indeed, the sixth amendment from which he draws his
principal support might also be read to explicitly preclude a right
to self-representation. The third obstacle is that in recognizing a
fundamental right to self-representation, the majority has made
the criminal justice system an "instrument of self-destruction." In
light of the high cost which self-representation may impose upon
the defendant, there is a certain moral reluctance to declare the
existence of such a right. However, appreciation of the discom-
fort which the Court's opinion generates imparts to Faretta its
primary significance as a statement on individual autonomy.
A. Competing Interests of the Defendant and the State
The first obstacle mentioned above, and, ostensibly the most
serious weakness in Justice Stewart's opinion, lies in the seemingly
narrow view which he brings to the criminal justice system. Be-
cause the state has a distinct interest in the outcome of the issue
it is important to examine closely the competing interests. It is also
necessary to recognize that not only is there a tension between the
defendant and the system, but there is also tension between the
different elements within the system itself. The proposition that
the defendant alone suffers the consequences of a conviction is
crucial to Justice Stewart's thesis.
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Chief Justice Burger argues that this is an inaccurate assessment:
Although we have adopted an adversary system of criminal
justice, . . . the prosecution is more than an ordinary
litigant, and the trial judge is not simply an automaton
who insures that technical rules are adhered to. Both
are charged with the duty of insuring that justice, . . .
is achieved in every criminal trial. That goal is ill served,
and the integrity of and public confidence in the system
are undermined, when an easy conviction is obtained due
to the defendant's ill-advised decision to waive counsel.98
There are two distinct approaches one can take in analyzing
the Justices' debate over the significance that should be granted
the competing state interest. Viewing the issues argued by both
men, it seems clear that each is stressing the policies and values
with which he is more concerned. Justice Stewart's position is
simply that the person who is the accused is the one who will be
incarcerated if convicted, and therefore, he should not be deprived of
the fundamental choice of determining what approach his defense
should take so as to ensure the most beneficial result.
By contrast, Chief Justice Burger has difficulty viewing the
defendant apart from the whole system. If the accused is con-
victed because of a poor defense, the public also suffers-though
not in the same way. The treatment of the defendant is a reflec-
tion upon the entire criminal process. Whatever transpires within
the criminal justice system reflects upon society.
Neither approach is inaccurate. The disagreement merely
emphasizes the priority of values which the Justices bring to the
conflict. Justice Stewart's point is clear if Faretta is seen as an
individual who has demanded his autonomy. However, Justice
Burger squarely presents the side of the issue which Justice Stewart
seems to have slighted.
Justice Burger would assert that the system has an interest in
the defendant's protection. Because it is a system, one element
cannot be manipulated without regard for its effect upon the
coexistent elements. The defendant is not alone in the crim-
inal justice system. The three-fold interests of the state cannot be
ignored, even if the result is a loss of a certain degree of the
defendant's autonomy. This is Justice Burger's concern.
98. Id. at 839 (citations omitted).
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The needs of the defendant seem clear; he would prefer not to
be convicted. Short of that, it would appear that he must be
allowed to maintain a sense of independence of action, free from
the feeling of having been "railroaded" or controlled by counsel.
It is in his interest that he present the defense he regards as most
appropriate or effective for him.
The state interests fall into three categories, reflecting the
state's own concern for the defendant, the prosecution, and the
public. For the defendant, the state demands the greatest pos-
sible measure of protection. Crucial to this aim is the effective
assistance of counsel. In addition, the state makes various con-
cessions to ensure that the defendant's rights are duly preserved.
One such protection is the inadmissibility of illegally obtained
evidence even if that evidence might be significant in attain-
ing a conviction. No less than for the defendant, the state must
provide the prosecution with a certainty of procedure. However,
self-representation by the accused brings an imbalance to the
system by virtue of the apparent handicap which the pro se de-
fendant bears. The technical niceties of the trial are disturbed.99
There is a greater amount of time consumed in a pro se trial.1-
There is also the necessity of greater caution imposed upon the
prosecution in consideration of the defendant's compromised
position.101
Last, and perhaps most important, are the interests of the peo-
ple. A system of criminal justice is developed with essentially
two goals-to achieve accuracy in the guilt determination process
and, at the same time, to commit the smallest possible offense against
the dignity and freedom of the defendant. 02 Achievement of these
goals is necessary to preserve public confidence in the working of
the system.103
Thus, it is clear that the state does have legitimate concerns
which must be recognized. What is not certain is how to promote
the needs of both the individual defendant and the needs of the
system. Mandatory assignment of counsel would appear to satisfy
both of those demands. It preserves a relatively equal status
99. Comment, The Right to Appear Pro Se: The Constitution and the Court,
64 J. CRm. L. 240, 249 (1973).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Sur-
vey and Criticism, 66 YAL L.J. 319, 347 (1957).
103. Id. at 350.
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between the adversaries by refusing to permit the defendant to
handicap himself. It protects the defendant from his own intem-
perate judgment. Thus, in granting the right to self-representation,
the majority appears to deny the state a twofold benefit: (1)
self-representation may diminish the protection of the defendant
and the public perception of the fairness of the criminal justice
system by permitting him to engage in the foolhardy pursuit of
presenting an inadequate defense; and (2) (possibly even more
damaging) the majority now subjects the states to a flood of
courtroom disruption, unfounded appeals by unsuccessful pro se
defendants, and calendar congestion. 04 While such predictions
may be exaggerated, they seem to deserve a greater show of
concern than expressed by Justice Stewart. The disharmony be-
tween the majority and dissenters in Faretta would seem to indi-
cate that compromise between the needs of the defendant and
the needs of the system may not be easy.
Therefore, in this surface view of the issues debated by Justice
Burger and Justice Stewart, it appears that Justice Burger has
determined that the state interests override the defendant's right
of total autonomy of choice. Justice Stewart, on the other hand,
seemingly takes an absolutist position in protecting the defendant's
autonomy and refusing -to consider the contrary interests of the
state.
However, Justice Stewart's conclusion may not be as inflexible
as the above discussion might indicate. Looking beneath the
surface of both positions and viewing the practical result of the
decision one can argue that the policies which the dissent es-
pouses are actually furthered by Justice Stewart's decision. It
may be the dissent that has taken an unrealistic view of the most
effective method of furthering these policies, and, ironically, takes
an absolutist position by asserting that the o4ly way to further
these policies is by imposing counsel upon the defendant.
All of the language concerning counsel and representation ob-
scures the real issue. The true aim of our system is effective
representation, 05 not merely the assistance of counsel. The dis-
104. 422 U.S. 806, 845.
105. "The right is of course to the 'effective assistance of counsel.' Ob-
viously, the effective assistance of counsel could be denied because incompetent
or indifferent counsel was appointed, although the Court has yet to deal with
the issue." U.S. Gov'T PRuNm'xc OFFIcE, Tim CoNsTrrotroN oF TmE UNrrmD
STATES 1222 (1971).
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tinction between the two is crucial in appreciating Faretta's po-
tential impact. Presumably, the purpose of appointing counsel
is to ensure effective representation. However, a pragmatic look
at the way the criminal justice system is functioning today indi-
cates that those defendants who depend upon court-appointed
lawyers or public defenders may not be receiving "effective assis-
tance." Delays result because overloaded attorneys need continu-
ances to handle the overload. 0 6 Although the public defenders
may demonstrate a high level of skill, it is simply not possible
to find the time and expend the interest necessary to prepare a
thorough case.
In light of the present state of affairs one must recognize the
real choice the defendant has been granted. It is not a question
of being represented either by a good, conscientious, interested
attorney, or stumbling blindly into court alone without a chance
of success. The merits of being assisted by counsel are, in fact,
not always overwhelming. It is conceivable that at least as ade-
quate a defense might be mounted by an intelligent defendant
whose sole concern is his own circumstance, and who has the
time and singular motivation to explore possible defenses.
The second misconception of the dissenters is that Justice
Stewart sees only the defendant, ignoring the system and society.
He was accused of granting a constitutional "right to self-destruc-
tion" via the criminal justice system. 07  But a close reading of
the majority opinion indicates a different conclusion. Justice
Stewart qualified the right to self-representation. 08 He made
provisions for state appointment of "stand-by" counsel.109 Finally,
he limited the disruption of the trial process that would be per-
mitted during a pro se defense. 10
The most important of the restrictions which the majority
imposed is that the defendant be capable of a voluntary and in-
106. L. KATZ, JusTIcE Is THE Ciinm 59 (1972).
107. 420 U.S. 806, 840 (1975).
108. Id. at 835-36.
109. Id. at 834-35 n.46.
110. Justice Stewart has again indulged in what seems to be a favorite
procedure of the Court-relegating to a footnote that which is an especially
significant point. See, e.g., U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4, which is generally recognized as the genesis of the double standard in
recent constitutional adjudication concerning protection to be given to personal
fundamental liberties and mere economic interests. See G. GuNTmm, CoN-
STTnUONAL LAw 593-95 (9th ed. 1975).
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telligent choice. The plain language of the opinion suggests little
as to what level of ability must be demonstrated before the de-
fendant is allowed to proceed pro se. Justice Stewart cites the stand-
ard requirements noted in Adams v. United States ex rel McCann for
waiver of constitutional rights."' The ability to understand and
know the consequences of a choice, however, is different from
the ability to avoid those consequences. Presumably, the com-
petence of the defendant will be explored in a pretrial hearing
as it was in Faretta.112  It remains to be seen, however, how
stringent the requirement will be." 3  Precisely because Justice
111. 420 U.S. 806-08.
112. See note 15 supra.
113. The waiver of certain constitutional rights has been defined by the
Supreme Court as the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1937). The valid-
ity of the waiver depends upon both the significance of the right and the
circumstances of the waiver itself. The Court will not readily infer a valid
waiver of important rights. A waiver of counsel must follow the guidelines
which the Court has established in order to be considered effective against a
later claim that no waiver was intended. Like a guilty plea, waiver will not
be presumed in the absence of a clear record. Mere failure to request counsel
is not to be taken as a waiver. Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 475
(1965).
The broadest requirement is that the trial judge must determine whether
the waiver is "an intelligent and competent one." Adams v. United States
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).
There is no question that the trial court must conduct some sort of inquiry
bearing upon the defendant's capacity to make an intelligent choice. Von
Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1947). The intelligence of the choice is to
be determined on a case by case basis. Clearly what might suffice as intelligent
for a relatively simple case may not be enough in a very complicated one.
The most widely accepted view of the essence of an intelligent waiver is
the defendant's full understanding of the consequences. That particular de-
termination depends "upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused."
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1937).
Competence also speaks to the steps which the court itself must take. The
accused must know, for instance, that he has a right to counsel. He must be
apprised of what he gives up when he waives counsel. The most definitive
accounting of what information the trial court must impart to the defendant
was made by Justice Black. A waiver "must be made with an apprehension
of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the
range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges
and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a
broad understanding of the whole matter." Von Molike v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708,724.
The Court in Faretta spoke very briefly of waiver. The standard refer-
ence to intelligent and competent waiver was made, but Justice Stewart pro-
vided no further elucidation. Considering that the right to waive counsel
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CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Stewart gives no definite standards, it might be expected that the
individual states will have a measure of choice."14 If Faretta is
read narrowly and a defendant is held to. the level of ability
Faretta himself displayed, then the consequences of the majority's
decision will not be so great. For, if a defendant has similar skill
and ability, the gap between his pro se defense and that presented
by an overworked public defender is less significant. Presumably
the bias of the state and the court will be to demand a fairly
significant showing. of ability. If that expectation is accurate,
Justice Stewart will have permitted only a small percentage of
defendants access to the right of self-representation. If the case is
read broadly so as to require a lesser degree of competence than
Faretta displayed, then there will be a greater number of defend-
ants affected.
Even assuming that the decision is read broadly, Justice Stew-
art has provided safeguards so as to protect the credibility of the
system. Stand-by counsel may be appointed and, if the occasion
should arise when the defendant is clearly, or even probably, un-
has now become constitutional, and that it does "fly into the face" of effec-
tive counsel requirements, it is apparent that the acceptable standard for an
intelligent waiver may be very high. That is to say, the defendant still does
not have an absolute right to self-representation. It is to be expected that
the courts will be especially diligent in assessing the individual capacity of
those intrepid pro se candidates which come before them. Insofar as Justice
Stewart explicitly allowed for the appointment of stand-by counsel and fore-
closed the possibility of appeals on the grounds of ineffective assistance, the
trial courts ought to be on notice that the pretrial hearing is not to be per-
formed in a cursory manner. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); United States v. McGee, 335 U.S. 17 (1957) vacating and remanding
per curiam, 242 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1957); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708 (1948); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); United States v. Adams
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
114. Here, Justice Stewart effectively meets another argument of the dis-
senters. Justice Burger had urged that, in the tradition of Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that the right to counsel in noncapital felony cases
is not fundamental and hence not a fourteenth amendment requirement upon
the states) the wisdom of federalism must be faithfully acknowledged and the
question of self-representation left to the individual states to decide. 422 U.S.
at 844. However, in drawing vague standards, Justice Stewart makes it clear
that the states have considerable latitude. Faretta requires that there be some
bottom line where, if a defendant demonstrates ability to defend pro se, he
must not be forced to have a lawyer. However, between the extremes of an
individual obviously incomlietent and one who is obviously very clever, the
states are relatively unrestricted in the absence of more specific direction from
the Court.
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able to proceed as had originally been determined, the state may
provide counsel. In addition, self-representation is not to be
regarded as a license for courtroom abuse. Nor will the inade-
quate quality of a pro se defense be considered as the sole grounds
for appeal, despite its failure as "effective assistance." Each of
these provisions serves a vital function in preserving the balance
between the individual and the state.
Chief Justice Burger is correct in contending that the system
must maintain its credibility and at least the appearance of justice
and fair administration. However, Justice Stewart effectively
furthers these policies without sacrificing the dignity of the indi-
vidual and his right to independent decisionmaking. Although
there still remains a small margin of harm for potential defend-
ants who, for one reason or another, are not protected by Justice
Stewart's carefully drafted procedure, it is a degree of risk that is
less discomforting than a system so inflexible that it would force
counsel on every defendant-counsel whose capacity to provide
effective representation is itself open to debate.
Therefore, to the extent that Justice Burger would complain
that Justice Stewart takes no account of society's expectations, the
reply is clear. Society's chief interests are considered. The de-
fendant must demonstrate an acceptable level of ability before
he may represent himself. He is further protected by the appoint-
ment of counsel. The integrity of the criminal justice process has
not been ignored. In addition, the prosecution is relieved of its
burden of excessive caution; the judge can remain a judge without
having to feel obliged to present the pro se defendant's case for
him.
In short, if society does "have the right to expect that, when
courts find new rights implied in the Constitution, their potential
effect upon the resources of our criminal justice system [must] be
considered,"" 5 the majority has fulfilled its duty. Further, if
the true need of a defendant is for quality representation, Faretta
does little damage." 6 If indeed there is harm for those defendants
who choose the pro se route, the risk is one that each has volun-
tarily assumed. Moreover, it is a risk which the Constitution
demands the defendant be permitted to choose.
115. Id. at 845.
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13. Textual Support for the Right to Self-Representation
The second weakness of the majority opinion is Justice Stew-
art's inability to rest his holding directly upon textual language.
There are two basic questions raised by his approach. The first
is whether it is an acceptable interpretation of the sixth amend-
ment in light of the Court's prior interpretations of that amend-
ment's explicit grant of a right to counsel. If not, is there legal
support to justify the holding or has the court indulged in the
jdicial extravagance which colored the development of substan-
tive due process and which rendered the Griswold and Wade
decisions so open to criticism?
Turning to the first problem, as was noted above Justice Stew-
art was unable to find the right to self-representation "in so many
words." l7 Accepting that the sixth amendment does not provide
explicit support, is his position nonetheless defensible? Such in-
quiry directs one to the longstanding debate over what constitutes
legitimate judicial interpretation."' Forced to reach a decision
on priority of social values, Justice Stewart adopted an approach
similar to that developed by the' Court in the area of procedural
due process to ensure that his judgment did not appear to be an
arbitrary substitution for that of the state legislature. He sought
support for his position from legislative and judicial sources which
indicated to him that self-representation ought to be considered
a fundamental right.119 Further, because it is fundamental, the
right must be protected from infringement by the state. This is
circuitous reasoning, but the chief difficulty with "due process" is
that it is such a vague term there will be persistent debate over
whether the justices picked the "proper" right to be protected.
In Griswold, there was no clear language which defined the right
to privacy. However, the Court affirmed the approach that dif-
ferent amendments create penumbral protection giving certain
unexpressed rights constitutional status. Self-representation, being
only a variant form of assistance of counsel, can thus fall within
the scope of the sixth amendment.
116. 422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46.
117. Id. at 819.
118. See generally Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitutiom 27 STAN.
L. REV. 703 (1975).
119. This technique seemingly complies with the Court's primary methodol-
ogy for discovering fundamental rights. For an extended discussion of the
Court's fundamental rights adjudication and an examination of the flaws inher-
ent in that approach to constitutional interpretation see Kadish, supra note 102.
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There is a final argument in defense of Justice Stewart's in-
terpretation. It has been observed: "The dominant norms of
decision are those large conceptions of government structure and
individual rights that are best referred to and whose content is
scarcely at all specified in the written Constitution-dual federal-
ism, vested rights . .," 120 If the measure of autonomy granted
by self-representation is in fact a logical derivative of th& vested
rights theory, Justice Stewart has not moved beyond the limits of
acceptable interpretation. Indeed, a holding that the defendant
must be bound by counsel would be patently incorrect.
C. Danger of Self-Inflicted Harm
The third weakness of the majority's decision lies in the poten-
tial for harm to a pro se defendant. The earlier analysis which
indicated that Justice Stewart has not been so bold as it initially
appears is based upon the supposition that society's expectation
is that each defendant is entitled to at least some level of adequate
representation. As was also indicated, the ability of the system to
provide that quality of representation for each defendant is under
serious challenge. The result is that a fairly competent defendant
may provide nearly the same caliber representation pro se as
might a harried public defender. However, such a proposition
presupposes that those who would elect self-representation are
primarily those relying upon the state for appointed counsel. It
must also be recognized that there are some defendants who may
be able to afford to retain very competent counsel. At that point
there will be a considerable gap between the potential quality of
representation and the actual skill of the pro se defendant. Al-
though the Constitution does not require that all defendants have
the "best" representation, Faretta now suggests that it permits a
defendant to pursue a potentially less skillful defense. That is one of
the implications of autonomy in Faretta.
The second difficulty lies in the latitude offered to the states
by Justice Stewart's guidelines. The right to self-representation is
limited; appropriate protective measures are to be implemented
by the individual states. What rehains to be seen is whether the
states will in fact assume the responsibility for seeing that what is
now only fearful speculation by Justice Burger does not become
120. Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REv. 703,
708 (1975).
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a reality. If Faretta is applied narrowly and the states do accept
the burden of careful preexamination, the criminal justice system
will seldom be subverted. Unfortunately, the record of speedy
and eager compliance with new constitutional demands upon state
criminal justice systems is not encouraging. 1 It is not possible to
predict whether states will be aggressive in requiring a high level
of demonstrated competence, or whether they will be content to
accept less than Faretta suggests.
Even assuming that the states implement all of Justice Stew-
art's devices for protecting the defendant, it is likely that some
defendants will in fact be permitted to represent themselves in-
competently. In all cases of pro se defense the defendant does
not even have the technical and procedural familiarity with the
local court system of an overworked public defender. The latter
maintains an undisputed advantage over a pro se defendant merely
by virtue of his ability to move about easily and be recognized in
a labyrinthic system.
The final criticism flows from the possibility of incompetent self-
representation, and the probability that states might not be so quick
to implement the safeguards Justice Stewart proposes. Must the
majority justify its position that "although he may conduct his
own defense ultimately to his detriment," 122 the defendant must
nonetheless be granted a constitutional right to an independent
choice? Probably not Justice Stewart qualified the right to self-
representation; he does not apologize for it: "[The accused's]
choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual
which is the lifeblood of the law.'" 2 In its role as a symbol
creator and as a reflector of contemporary values, 24 the Court
demonstrates that the preeminence of individual choice must be
affirmed as against the prospect of excessive state control. Not-
withstanding that the holding in Faretta will necessarily permit
some defendants to reject a measure of the protection which the
Constitution grants, the greater societal interest in individual au-
tonomy will be served as a result.
Finally, the querulous dissents of Justices Burger and Blackmun
generate the impression that tension must exist between the state
and the individual. Such a view misrepresents society's expecta-
121. A. LEwis, GmnoN's TRumpET 193-97 (1966).
122. 422 U.S. at 834.
123. Id., quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1969).
124. R. McCI-os , supra note 67, at 18-23.
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tions. By considering primarily the defendant, Justice Stewart
focuses on an issue which transcends the notion of a simple
state-defendant contest. Society's goals need not be measured
against private rights.1 5  The public good is served equally by
"the promotion, protection, and enjoyment of private right[s]: 126
Society has an interest in the proper functioning of the criminal
justice system, but it has designated the preferable social goal.
There is a more urgent public need to preserve the dignity of the
individual than merely to protect him and to streamline the system.
Faretta is not the first decision of the Court which casts an
uneasy reflection upon society. The Court's holding in Roe v.
Wade, that the state could not prohibit a woman from obtaining
an abortion, created an appearance of insensitivity to the value of
potential life. But what must be appreciated is that individual
autonomy and, personal liberty cannot be encouraged without a
concommitant loss to society. The comfort of a wholly protected
and regulated society must be surrendered in part to permit the
individual to control matters fundamental to his own intellectual
and emotional security. It is a legitimate argument that self-
representation subjects the pro se defendant to the potentially
unfortunate ends of his own folly. The only alternative is to deny
self-representation constitutional status. But, as Justice Stewart
concluded, that is an untenable choice.
VI. CONCLUSION
Faretta v. California presented the Court with an unusual chal-
lenge. In order to protect the freedom of choice implicit in the
liberty granted by the fourteenth amendment, the Court recog-
nized the constitutional right of a defendant to represent himself
in a criminal prosecution. Justice Stewart, writing for the major-
ity, held that respect for individual autonomy required the recog-
nition that the sixth amendment implicitly necessitates that con-
stitutional right. No state can force counsel upon a defendant
competent to choose a pro se defense.
Whether Justice Stewart's approach will be successful is still
to be seen. The state which does in fact scrupulously adhere to
the protective safeguards--stringent pretrial examination and ap-
pointment of standby counsel-will not be jeopardizing its criminal
125. Henkin, supra note 56, at 1410.
126. Id.
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justice system. Nor will its pro se defendants be ignored. But the
fact that all the safeguards were not made mandatory leaves room
for abuse. One can only hope that the states show a sensitivity
to the sixth amendment rights of defendants and develop careful
guidelines to protect them.
Nevertheless, Justice Stewart's vehement defense of the indi-
viduars right to self-determination is certainly consistent with the
Court's enhancement of individual autonomy, and it speaks well
for the evolving values of our society.
MARY E. LEvws
